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Abstract—The rapid increase of diverse Internet of things
(IoT) services and devices has raised numerous challenges in
terms of connectivity, computation, and security, which networks
must face in order to provide satisfactory support. This has
led to networks evolving into heterogeneous IoT networking
infrastructures characterized by multiple access technologies and
mobile edge computing (MEC) capabilities. The heterogeneity
of the networks, devices, and services introduces serious vul-
nerabilities to security attacks, especially distributed denial-of-
service (DDoS) attacks, which exploit massive IoT devices to
exhaust both network and victim resources. As such, this study
proposes MECshield, a localized DDoS prevention framework
leveraging MEC power to deploy multiple smart filters at
the edge of relevant attack-source/destination networks. The
cooperation among the smart filters is supervised by a central
controller. The central controller localizes each smart filter by
feeding appropriate training parameters into its self-organizing
map (SOM) component, based on the attacking behavior. The
performance of the MECshield framework is verified using three
typical IoT traffic scenarios. The numerical results reveal that
MECshield outperforms existing solutions.
Index Terms—Mobile edge computing, self-organizing map,
DDoS attack, heterogeneous IoT networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent report by Gartner [1], 20.4 billion Internet of
things (IoT) devices are expected to be in use by 2020, an
increase of 219% from 2016. These devices have become
popular in whole market segments, including consumer appli-
cations, cross-industry business, and vertical-specific industry.
This IoTization boom poses several challenges for IoT net-
works, including access connectivity, offloading computation,
and security. In particular, lightweight IoT devices, which are
typically characterized by low computing power, are exploited
by attackers to generate flooding traffic in distributed denial-
of-service (DDoS) attacks. For instance, a swarm of IoT
devices, hijacked by Mirai malware, generated about 1 Tbps
of DDoS traffic to a French webhost in September 2016 [2].
These vulnerabilities pose serious challenges to IoT systems.
Consequently, networking infrastructures are evolving into
heterogeneous IoT (H-IoT) networks, which are character-
ized by diverse IoT devices, multiple access technologies,
and powerful computation provided at the edge tier, referred
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to as mobile edge computing (MEC) [3]. Along with the
softwarization capability of emerging technologies, such as
software-defined network function virtualization (SDNFV),
MEC-enabled H-IoT networks support a promising frame-
work for H-IoT security. Security-as-a-service (SaaS) can be
deployed with the support of MEC technology to prevent
internal/external attacks from/to the H-IoT networks.
Based on the above analysis, we propose a DDoS preven-
tion framework, called MECshield. MECshield utilizes MEC
technology to provide localized smart filters against mali-
cious threats at the edge of relevant attack-source/destination
networks. A central controller orchestrates the cooperation
among the smart filters through policy dispatches. The policies
are generated based on attack-behavior analyses conducted
at an attack analyzer in the central controller, before being
dispatched to the corresponding smart filters at the attack-
source sites. In each smart filter, a self-organizing map (SOM)
component [4] is trained simultaneously using local traffic,
under the supervision of the dispatched policy. The trained
SOM detects malicious IoT traffic by matching the traffic
features into the SOM map in order to identify whether it
represents a DDoS attack.
Accordingly, the MECshield framework is characterized by:
• Cooperation, where the central controller distributes the
features of malicious traffic analyzed at the victim sites to
the corresponding smart SOM filters at the attack-source
sites via policy dispatches.
• Distribution, where malicious threats are handled simul-
taneously at multiple attack-source sites and at the attack-
destination sites. In other words, bottleneck problems,
which are a crucial issue in DDoS attacks, are mitigated.
• Local adaptation, where each smart SOM filter is trained
using local traffic features collected from the H-IoT on
which the smart SOM filter has been deployed.
There are three benefits of the MECshield framework:
• Intermediate traffic reduction: Since smart SOM filters
are deployed in front of the attack source, malicious
traffic generated by H-IoT devices is typically blocked
at the edge.
• Detection and accuracy improvement: This is the result of
two main features of MECshield: (i) continuous localized
training, and (ii) implementation in proximity to the
attack source and destination. The first feature adapts the
smart SOM filter to time/position-varying H-IoT traffic.
Meanwhile, the second feature provides two protection
layers against malicious traffic.
• Prevention performance increase: Owing to its dis-
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Fig. 1. Scenarios of DDoS attacks in MEC-enabled H-IoT networks.
tributed architecture, MECshield avoids the bottleneck
problem typical in DDoS attacks. Moreover, the two
protection layers at the attack-source/destination sites are
supervised by the central controller for traffic handling
orchestration.
II. MEC-ENABLED HETEROGENEOUS IOT NETWORKS
This section describes the features of MEC-enabled H-
IoT networks for determining their vulnerabilities (V1, V2,
and V3) and resistance (R1, R2, and R3) to DDoS attacks;
see Fig. 1 for the reference model. MEC-enabled H-IoT
networks consist of various local IoT networks distributed at
the edge and interconnected via the core infrastructure. The
following features are derived from two distinguishing facets
of the network: the heterogeneity of IoT devices, and external
computation served by MEC.
Power-constrained devices (V1): Although IoT does not
exclude high-power devices, those with constrained power in
terms of computing resources and memory typically occupy
the dominant position [5]. Owing to their lack of compu-
tational power, these IoT devices may not support complex
and evolving security algorithms, such as effective encryption
for data transfer and endpoint protection against local security
attacks. Furthermore, the weak security implemented on these
devices (e.g., default and hard-coded passwords) means ex-
ploiting and recruiting them into botnets and injecting different
types of malware are trivial tasks for even unskilled attackers
(script kiddies).
Massive connections (V2): Billions of connected IoT de-
vices generate massive volumes of data. This is an important
ingredient for effective DDoS attacks. The traffic is usually
generated from many constrained H-IoT devices. However, the
same amount of traffic might also be generated from fewer
powerful devices in other networks. These factors make H-
IoT traffic containing malicious DDoS flows more difficult to
handle than other network traffic.
Heterogeneous group-specific traffic (V3): H-IoT traffic
is considered heterogeneous from a macro perspective, but
group-specific from the perspective of each local network [6].
In particular, IoT devices serving individual applications may
be separately connected in different virtual local area networks
(VLANs), which can be managed at the edge of the H-IoT
networks. In general, each IoT application transfers data in its
own way. As such, the generated traffic can be identified via a
tuple of flow parameters, such as protocols, ports, transmission
rates, and transmission contiguity. From a security viewpoint,
the aggregated traffic at the attack-destination site is classified
into a heterogeneous category, while the outgoing traffic from
the attack-source sites is divided into a group-specific category.
This classification is meaningful for the adaptive development
of security strategies against malicious traffic.
Edge cloudization (R1): MEC technology provides
cloudization capabilities at the edge of the H-IoT network.
This is characterized by ultra-low execution latency and
context-aware computation [7]. This environment enables
services such as resource scheduling, and security protection
to be scalably deployed in proximity to the IoT devices.
Therefore, comprehensive DDoS prevention, facilitated by
the MEC, can be implemented in collaboration with advanced
techniques such as machine learning and big data mining in
a local context.
Service execution offloading (R2): Edge cloudization has
enabled the increasingly popular service execution offloading
in H-IoT. While lightweight IoT devices lack the powerful
computation capability necessary for the timely execution of
complex services, the networks are equipped with sufficient
computational resources to provide tailored service execution
on demand. This trend has resulted in traffic behavior that
prioritizes local processing at the edge, rather than on Internet
servers. Tracking this traffic behavior of each local network
might help to detect security threats when abnormal traffic
behavior occurs.
Contextual information fusion (R3): Although the traffic
properties can be distinguished among local IoT networks,
applications running at the edge may need to merge contextual
IoT data to obtain comprehensive information. The relation-
ships among contextual IoT data can be considered a criterion
for abnormal traffic detection when individual partners defect
[8]. For instance, standard images are transferred from cameras
to a surveillance system during the day, while thermographic
images and motion detection signals are more useful at night.
The traffic is considered abnormal when, for example, ther-
mographic images are sent during the day, or standard images
are sent at night.
III. SECURITY PROBLEM STATEMENT
This section analyzes the adversary models of two DDoS
attack scenarios (a volumetric DDoS attack and an application
layer attack) in terms of the attack objectives, initial capabil-
ities, and process.
Objective: The objectives of the scenarios are as follows:
(i) Scenario 1 – A volumetric DDoS attack on the infras-
tructure between users on the Internet and a data center.
The objective is to send lots of bogus traffic generated
from compromised H-IoT devices so that total malicious
traffic size exceeds the capacity of the network. This is
the most prevalent type of DDoS attack, constituting 73%
of all DDoS attacks experienced in 2016 [9].
(ii) Scenario 2 – An application layer DDoS attack on a
server. The objective is to flood the server with seemingly
legitimate, but bogus requests in order to exhaust the
ability of the application to serve legitimate users. This
is a more sophisticated type of DDoS attack, and is
difficult to detect because the attack traffic is not easily
distinguishable from benign traffic. The number of such
attacks increased by 95% between 2015 and 2016. [9].
Initial capabilities: In order to execute the attacks, we
assume the adversary has the following capabilities:
• Botnet: Access to a group of compromised IoT devices
(H-IoT botnet). The adversary may be the owner of the
botnet (botmaster), or may have access to it through a
third party (e.g., a DDoS-for-hire service).
• Command and Control (C2): A command and control
infrastructure (C2), which is used to control the compro-
mised devices and, possibly to recruit additional devices.
• System Knowledge: Some knowledge about the victim,
such as IP addresses, domain names, existing vulnerabil-
ities, and so on.
• Amplifiers: Poorly configured network services (e.g.,
Open DNS resolver), which the attacker can exploit to
increase the volume of the generated botnet traffic. This
capability is crucial for the attack in scenario 1.
• IP Spoofing: Ability to spoof the source IP address of
the botnet traffic. This capability reflects the amplified
botnet traffic by sending it to the victim rather than the
real source.
Attack process: The attack process in each scenario is
described as follows:
1) Scenario 1:
• Botnet Activation: The attacker uses a controller to send
commands to the H-IoT botnet. The instructions may
include the victims IP address, attack rate, target service
(DNS, NTP, and SSDP etc.).
• Traffic Generation: The botnet is used to generate traffic
using the above parameters.
• Amplification: Some UDP-based network protocols have
a high bandwidth amplification factor, which simply
means they return very large responses for much smaller
requests. For example, DNS has an amplification factor
of 28 to 54, NTP has a factor of 556.9, and SSDP has a
factor of 30.8 [10]. This property is exploited by attackers
in volumetric DDoS attacks, in which a large H-IoT
botnet is used to send requests to these services in order
to generate an enormous amount of traffic as a response.
• Reflection: The source IP address of the botnet packets is
spoofed and replaced with the IP address of the victim.
Therefore, the amplified traffic is sent to the victim rather
than to the attacker.
• Network Disruption/Degradation: The network capacity
is eventually exceeded by the amplified and reflected
traffic, thereby degrading or disrupting the operations of
the network.
2) Scenario 2:
• Botnet Activation: This process is the same as that in
scenario 1.
• Traffic Generation: At this stage, traffic is generated from
each compromised device in the H-IoT botnet. The intent
of the attacker is not easily discernible because the traffic
conforms to all protocols.
• Flooding: At this stage, the attacker floods the server
with requests from each compromised device in the H-IoT
botnet. There are three types of application layer flooding
attacks: session flooding, where each device sends ses-
sions at higher rates than those of non-malicious users;
request flooding, where each attack session involves send-
ing higher requests than those of non-malicious users; and
an asymmetric attack, where each attack session contains
requests with much higher workloads than those of non-
malicious sessions.
• Service Disruption/Degradation: The capacity of the
server to respond to user requests is eventually exceeded,
thus making the server unavailable.
IV. MECSHIELD FRAMEWORK
Based on the previously mentioned security problems, we
propose MECshield, a novel DDoS prevention framework.
A. Design Rationale
The rationale behind the MECshield framework design
includes (i) utilizing MEC technology to provide distributed
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Fig. 2. MECshield framework for heterogeneous IoT.
security agents in front of the attack-source/destination sites;
(ii) well-adaptation to local traffic of the SOM filter at each
agent with purpose of abnormal detection improvement; and
(iii) cooperation among the agents, supervised by a central
controller. The smart SOM filter in each MECshield agent
simultaneously classifies outgoing traffic from IoT devices and
is trained by local traffic, monitored in real-time.
B. Self-Organizing Map algorithm
The SOM algorithm is one of the most effective unsu-
pervised learning solutions in Artificial Neural Networks,
which converts a higher-dimensional input space into a lower-
dimensional representation called a SOM as illustrated on the
left side of Figure 2. The SOM classifies a new input vector
based on two main modes: training and mapping. The former
builds the map using input samples, while the latter classifies
new input vectors by finding a winning neuron which has the
smallest Euclidean distance in the map. In this work, we utilize
a k-neuron two-dimensional SOM, where the j-th neuron has
a weight vector −→wj =
[
wj1,wj2, . . . ,wjm
]
, within a dimension
m, equal to the number of considered traffic features. Initially,
the weight vector of each neuron in the SOM is generated
randomly and the feature values in a training vector is always
formed into an [0.0, 1.0] range. Thereafter, whenever an i-th
training vector −→xi =
[
xj1, xj2, . . . , xjm
]
arrives, the winning
neuron
−→
w∗i is selected by finding the minimum Euclidean
distance between the training vector and the neurons, as
follows:
−→
w∗i = min∀−→wj ∈W
©­«
√
m∑
k=1
(xik − wjk)2ª®¬ . (1)
The weights of the winning neuron and its neighboring neu-
rons (determined by a neighborhood radius function) are then
updated to make them closer to the training vector.
C. MECshield Framework
Figure 2 illustrates the proposed MECshield framework.
Logically, the MECshield framework consists of a central
controller and multiple agents located at the edge of each
local network. The communication between the central con-
troller and the distributed agents is facilitated via secure
channels/protocols supported by the H-IoT networks (e.g.,
Openflow protocol on secure management channels in SDNFV
technology).
MECshield controller: The main purpose of the central
controller is to orchestrate operations among the distributed
agents. A local network might act as the source or destination
of DDoS attacks. Therefore, each local network requires a
different smart SOM filtering strategy, based on its position in
the attack scenario. For instance, an attack-destination site that
suffers extreme flooding traffic should deploy an appropriate
SOM training strategy to focus on the traffic protocol, port
number, and flow number, including the IP address classes
of the incoming traffic. Alternatively, the source site(s) of the
attack should be more concerned with features of its outgoing
traffic for individual sources, such as the protocol, port num-
ber, flow number, packet number per flow, and transmission
contiguity. Thus, only the attack-source sites participate in
DDoS defense. Therefore, cooperation among the distributed
local agents is crucial for an effective defense. The components
of the MECshield controller are described as follows:
• Report collector: This component gathers traffic reports
from distributed agents including traffic protocols, port
ranges, volume or traffic flow quantity, source IP ad-
dress ranges, and destination IP address(es). Adopting
the requirements of the detection mechanism applied
in the attack analyzer, the collected information is pre-
processed and updated at the report collector before being
transferred to the attack analyzer. For instance, to analyze
the characteristics of a spoofed DDoS flooding attack,
protocol, port range and volume are necessary for attack
investigation.
• Attack analyzer: First, DDoS attack detection techniques
[11] are utilized to identify the attack symptom based
on the processed information from the report collector.
Once the attack is identified, further information is then
considered to recognize attack targets, attack methods.
For example, Smurf and fraggle attacks produce tremen-
dous numbers of packets on some flows to exhaust the
capability of the victim, while TCP SYN attacks establish
large numbers of connections to the victim during a short
period [12].
• Policy generator: Once the DDoS attack is identified,
primary policies are generated and forwarded to the
MECshield agents located at the edges of the source
and destination sites of the attack. The policies contain
summary information of the attack (target, attack method
and possible mitigation policies) and desired features.
The feature information will be delivered to the feature
extractor module via the local policy conductor at both
source and destination site agents in order to request for
desired extraction, which is used in the SOM classifica-
tion process.
MECshield agent: The primary purpose of MECshield
agents is to mitigate the DDoS traffic and the components
of MECshield agent are as follows:
• Traffic monitor: The main function supported by this
component is to make the traffic statistics report. It
regularly captures statistics of incoming traffic, in-
cluding traffic protocols, service ports, volumes and
source/destination IP addresses. This information is de-
livered to the report collector in the central controller. In
addition, incoming traffic is also forwarded to the feature
extractor in order to make the SOM map’s inputs.
• Local policy conductor: Based on the primary policy
dispatched from the controller, the local policy conductor
informs the feature extractor about prominent features in
order to make a tuple of features for each input vector
in the SOM map classification procedure. Moreover, the
local policy conductor will send mitigation information to
the smart SOM filter agent to apply appropriate policies
for attack traffic. For example, a drop action should be
given to TCP SYN flooding attack flows because of the
number of flow is huge and the packet per flow is tiny,
meanwhile a blocking action should be applied for attack
flows transferring a large amount of packet in a flow.
• Feature extractor: This component extracts the features of
traffic delivered from the traffic monitor and make tuples
for the SOM inputs based on requirements of the local
policy conductor. Then, it forwards these tuples to the
smart filter agent for classifying and training.
• Smart SOM filter: First, the SOM is trained continuously
by input vectors transferred from the feature extractor.
Second, when a vector of DDoS attack traffic is rec-
ognized at the SOM, the smart SOM filter notifies the
switching/routing component. Consequently, a protection
mode is activated and the outgoing traffic is switched
through the filter. The protection mode is deactivated if
the SOM does not receive a training vector of a DDoS
attack within a pre-defined duration. Finally, mitigating
the DDoS attack by dropping the traffic is classified by
the SOM as malicious.
• Switching/Routing: This is a basic function of edges used
to handle incoming/outgoing traffic.
D. Operational Workflow
To describe the operational workflow of MECshield, we
consider a normal and a DDoS attack.
Under normal conditions, the protection mode is deacti-
vated; that is, outgoing traffic from IoT devices bypasses the
smart SOM filter to improve the networking performance. In
this case, the traffic is still captured by the traffic monitor to
extract features for smart SOM training and for traffic statistics
reports (yellow lines in Figure 2). Whenever a DDoS symptom
is detected by the attack analyzer in the controller or by the
smart SOM filter in the local agent, the protection mode is
activated.
In the DDoS attack condition, the outgoing traffic from IoT
devices should go through the smart SOM filter. Depending on
the classification provided by the filter, detected DDoS traffic
is dropped. The traffic monitor collects statistics on the DDoS
traffic, which it reports to the controller. After identifying the
attack targets and attack methods, the controller dispatches
primary policies to all agents distributed at the edge of the
corresponding local networks. The local policy conductor in
each MECshield agent assigns requirements to the feature
extractor to generate appropriate training vectors, and it also
informs the smart SOM filter about possible mitigation policies
to tackle attack traffic flows. During attack time, the smart
SOM filter still transfers incoming attack traffic (red lines in
Figure 2) to the traffic monitor and the feature extractor to
generate statistics and make training samples, respectively.
The security performance of the proposed framework is
achieved through two layers of protection given by the MEC-
shield agents at the attack-source and destination sites.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section describes the experiment setup, and then pro-
vide an in-depth performance analysis of the DDoS defense
system.
A. Experiments
1) Training data sets for the smart SOM filter: Initially, the
smart SOM filters are trained using data sets of DDoS attack
TABLE I
STATISTICAL INFORMATION OF CAIDA, NSL-KDD AND DARPA DATA
SETS
CAIDA
Traffic state TCP ICMP Others
(%) (%) (%)
Normal (2015) 88.45 6.0 5.55
Attack (2007) 7.58 91.25 1.17
NSL-KDD
Attack Training Testing Features
types patterns patterns
back, land, neptune, 45927 7458 41
pod, smurf, teardrop
DARPA
Attack types Attack source Attack time
SYN flooding 100 different IPs 6 minutes
and normal traffic. The DDoS-attack training sets are obtained
from three data sets: CAIDA-attack-traffic [13], NSL-KDD
[14], and DARPA 2009 Intrusion Detection [15]. The normal-
traffic training set is derived from CAIDA-normal-traffic [13].
Statistics of these data sets are provided in Table I.
Owing to the wide variety of H-IoT devices, we generalize
the types of traffic into three categories:
• Sensor traffic: This traffic is generated by sensor devices
in a fixed period, with a low number of packets per flow.
• Monitor traffic: This involves real-time traffic, character-
ized by a small number of flows and a significant number
of packets per flow (e.g., camera).
• Alarm traffic: This traffic type is not easily discernible
because alarm IoT devices only generate traffic when an
abnormal event occurs. However, we assume the alarm
traffic has both moderate flows and a moderate number
of packets per flow.
Therefore, only samples that belong to the three categories
mentioned above are extracted from the CAIDA, NSL-KDD,
and DARPA data sets to train the SOM filters. Accordingly,
a tuple (protocol, port number, flow number) is applied for
SOM training in the MECShield agent at the destination-
site; at the source-site, a tuple (protocol, port number, flow
number, packet/flow, transmission contiguity) is used. Then,
each traffic type is trained by a set of 10000 samples. And,
key parameters of the SOM map are as follows: neuron number
is 400, learning rate is set to 0.1, and output dimension is 2.
2) Emulation Setup: To emulate a distributed MEC net-
work, we set up a SDNFV-enabled network of four physical
servers. This comprises the MECshield controller and three
MECshield agents directly connected to three IoT networks
(sensor, monitor, and alarm) comprising both SOM filtering
and switching/routing features. For convenience, we imple-
ment the MECshield agent as a software-based box including
SOM, OpenvSwitch functionality and other modules. Further-
more, we can configure the OpenvSwitch agent to forward
local traffic to a smart SOM filter before leaving the machine
[12]. Applications in MEC servers store IoT incoming traffic
and send back to IoT clients a simple response message
confirming receipt of the data.
3) Testing Process: To assess the proposed framework, a
test is carried out, along with two other schemes (a Central-
ized-SOM and a Distributed-SOM [12]). In the Centralized-
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SOM solution, a SOM filter is placed at the controller, and
all H-IoT traffic is forwarded to the controller for analysis.
Meanwhile, in the Distributed-SOM mechanism, the SOM
maps trained by all agents are merged at the controller after
the training period. Afterward, the merged SOM is returned to
the agents for local traffic handling [12]. Note that all solutions
use the same training data sets. For each local IoT network,
we use the BoNeSi simulator tool to generate different levels
of attack traffic (50, 100, 200, and 300 Mbps) in all schemes.
B. Emulation Results and Analysis
1) Attack Reaction Performance: The first criterion is the
attack reaction time at each edge agent. In this measurement,
we record four different attack traffic levels, as depicted in
Figure 3. These results can be explained as follows:
• In the Centralized-SOM, there is a considerable delay
because traffic is forwarded to the controller from the
edge devices for attack investigation. Afterwards, policies
are sent back to edges for appropriate traffic-handling
operations.
• In the other schemes, if the smart SOM filter at an edge
agent detects malicious patterns, it immediately applies
the determined policies to the attack traffic by preventing
it from entering the distribution network. Therefore, the
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time taken to react to attack patterns of the MECshield
framework and the Distributed-SOM solution are lower
for all traffic levels.
2) Detection rate and Accuracy Improvements: As a second
criterion, we measure the detection rate and accuracy of three
schemes. Figure 4 presents the detection rate and accuracy
of the three approaches. In both criteria, the MECshield
performed better than the other schemes. This is because
SOM maps in the MECshield agents are separately trained
by different local IoT traffic. Hence, these filters find it easier
to recognize patterns or they are well-adapted to local IoT
traffic in other word. Conversely, with a fixed and limited
number of neurons in a smart SOM agent, if there are many
traffic types trained for a SOM map (Centralized-SOM case),
or several merging times in the case of a Distributed-SOM
mechanism, the weights of each neuron in the SOM map will
change considerably. This leads to the degradation of both the
detection rate and the accuracy of these schemes.
3) Bottleneck-Handling Performance: To assess the robust-
ness of the schemes, we investigate the problem of bottlenecks
occurring in the controller during our experiments. The results
are shown in Figure 5. A major difference is observed between
distributed and centralized solutions. Both MECshield and
the Distribued-SOM show acceptable CPU usage of around
35%. However, the Centralized-SOM mechanism shows a
high usage of the controller’s CPU (83%, on average); this is
because edge node traffic is always forwarded to the controller
for processing, which becomes the bottleneck during DDoS
attacks.
4) Overall CPU Resource Consumption: Finally, we assess
the MECshield framework’s overall CPU resource consump-
tion in the case of DDoS attacks coming from several IoT net-
works. We record the CPU usage of all machines and evaluate
the average system resource consumption. The CPU usage of
MECshield, the Distributed-SOM, and the Centralized-SOM
are 36%, 43%, and 46%, respectively. As discussed in Section
IV-C, we consider the IP ranges of incoming traffic. Therefore,
depending on the IP ranges, the MECshield controller can
inform dedicated agents to enable the SOM filter function in
the case of attacks. As a result, the MECshield framework can
save resources because of the limited number of running SOM
filters. In contrast, the Distributed-SOM and Centralized-SOM
schemes always have to enable all SOM filter agents. Hence,
the computing resources are consumed, even if there is no
incoming traffic.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this study, we propose MECshield, a DDoS prevention
framework that leverages MEC power to deploy multiple
smart filters at the edge of attack-source/destination networks.
MECshield enables the network to defend against malicious
traffic from H-IoT devices through smart SOM filters deployed
in front of the attack source. Experimental results show that the
detection rate and accuracy are improved because of the well-
adaptation to local traffic at the SOM filters. Moreover, the
distributed architecture and control scheme of the MECshield
avoids the bottleneck occurring in DDoS attacks, and saves
around 10% resource consumption in terms of CPU usage
compared to other methods. Finally, MECshield introduces
an efficient and feasible security framework for an H-IoT
environment.
REFERENCES
[1] Gartner, Inc., “Gartner says 8.4 billion connected ”things” will be in
use in 2017, up 31 percent from 2016,” (cited Oct. 10, 2017). [Online].
Available:http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3598917
[2] C. Kolias, G. Kambourakis, A. Stavrou, and J. Voas, “DDoS in the IoT:
Mirai and other botnets,” IEEE Computer, vol. 50, no. 7, pp. 80–84,
2017.
[3] X. Sun and N. Ansari, “EdgeIoT: Mobile edge computing for the Internet
of things,” IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 54, no. 12, pp. 22–29,
2016.
[4] T. Kohonen, “Essentials of the self-organizing map,” Neural networks,
vol. 37, pp. 52–65, 2013.
[5] J. Lin, W. Yu, N. Zhang, X. Yang, H. Zhang, and W. Zhao, “A survey
on Internet of things: architecture, enabling technologies, security and
privacy, and applications,” IEEE Internet of Things Journal, vol. 4, no. 5,
pp. 1125–1142, 2017.
[6] F. Alam, R. Mehmood, I. Katib, N. Albogami, and A. Albeshri, “Data
fusion and IoT for smart ubiquitous environments: A survey,” IEEE
Access, vol. 5, pp. 9533–9554, 2017.
[7] Y. C. Hu, M. Patel, D. Sabella, N. Sprecher, and V. Young, “Mobile
edge computing – A key technology towards 5G,” ETSI White Paper
No. 11, 2015.
[8] A. Aleroud and G. Karabatis, “Contextual information fusion for in-
trusion detection: a survey and taxonomy,” Knowledge and Information
Systems, vol. 52, no. 3, pp. 563–619, 2017.
[9] D. Anstee, P. Bowen, C. F. Chui, and G. Sockrider, “Worldwide
infrastructure security report,” Arbort Networks special report – Volume
XII, 2017.
[10] E. Leverett and A. Kaplan, “Towards estimating the untapped potential:
a global malicious DDoS mean capacity estimate,” Journal of Cyber
Policy, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 195–208, 2017.
[11] S. T. Zargar, J. Joshi, and D. Tipper, “A survey of defense mechanisms
against distributed denial of service (ddos) flooding attacks,” IEEE
Communications Surveys Tutorials, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 2046–2069, Fourth
2013.
[12] T. V. Phan, N. K. Bao, and M. Park, “Distributed-SOM: A novel per-
formance bottleneck handler for large-sized software-defined networks
under flooding attacks,” Journal of Network and Computer Applications,
vol. 91, pp. 14–25, 2017.
[13] CAIDA, “The CAIDA datasets of anonymized Internet traces
and DDoS attack,” (cited Sep. 10, 2017). [Online]. Available:
https://data.caida.org/datasets/
[14] NSL-KDD, “Data set for network-based intrusion
detection systems,” (cited Sep. 10, 2017). [Online].
Available:https://data.caida.org/datasets/security/ddos-20070804/
[15] LANDER, “LANDER:DARPA DDoS attack-20091105,” (cited Sep. 10,
2017). [Online]. Available:https://ant.isi.edu/datasets/readmes/DARPA-
2009-DDoS-attack-20091105.README.txt
